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Pleading- Limitation on Right to Amend Defective Pleading.-In an action
against four defendants, three of them demurred to a third amended com-
plaint on ground that as to them the complaint stated no cause of action. In
sustaining the demurrers part of the trial court's order was as follows: "It
appearing from said third amended complaint and the three complaints pre-
viously served and filed herein, the decision of the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin with respect to the last of said previous complaints and the entire record
herein that the facts reiterated in all said complaints without change and obvi-
ously undisputed negative the existence in plaintiff of any actual and just cause
of action against said demurring defendants and that the following order
should be made herein in the interests of justice.
"It Is Further Ordered that leave to further amend be withheld unless and
until the plaintiff makes due application for such leave accompanied by the
tender of pleading sufficient to withstand demurrer and a showing sufficient in
law to satisfy the court that plaintiff is justly entitled to such leave to amend."
From a judgment on the merits, upon motion of defendants, and a dismissal
of the complaint, plaintiff appealed.
Held; judgment of trial court affirmed. Since pleading over is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court, plaintiff is not entitled to amend
his complaint indefinitely. The plaintiff having failed to apply to the trial court
for leave to amend in accordance with the order, he elected thereby to stand
or fall upon the third amended complaint. Since an earlier complaint had been
passed on by this court he knew in what respects it had been held defective,
he knew whether there were facts which if alleged and set out in the com-
plaint would cure the defect. Because of this and the three unsuccessful at-
tempts to state a cause of action it was not an abuse of discretion to withhold
leave to amend the complaint a fourth time except on proper showing. Angers
v. Sabatinelli et al., 1 N.W. (2d) 765 (Wis. 1942).
The number of times a party to a civil action may amend his pleading or
plead over is, at common law and under the majority of state codes, a matter
largely within the discretion of the trial court, and an order granting or deny-
ing leave to amend will not be overruled unless there is a manifest abuse of
discretion. Typically, in agreement with the principal case, where a plaintiff
had three opportunities in a California court to make a good complaint and
failed, the appellate court said, "Three failures to make a good complaint fairly
indicate that a fourth attempt would also be unavailing. The proposed amend-
ment, or proposed amended pleading, was not tendered to the court for inspec-
tion, and we see nothing erroneous in the action of the trial court in refusing
to allow further amendments. The failure to make good pleading probably
arises in lack of facts, rather than in the fault of the pleader." Dukes v. Kellog,
127 Cal. 563, 60 Pac. 44 (1900).
Similarly, it was held not an abuse of discretion to deny a third amend-
ment to a complaint held insufficient on a general demurrer, because "we must
assume that the questions presented were fully discussed and argued before the
court below and the plaintiff thus made thoroughly familiar with the particular
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respect wherein his pleading was deficient. It is therefore probable that the
plaintiff is without facts necessary to bring himself within the views herein
expressed or the allegations requisite to state a cause of action against defend-
ant. Bour v. Spring Valley Water Co., 8 Cal. App. 588, 97 Pac. 530 (1908);
see also, Loeffler v. Wright, 13 Cal. App. 224, 109 Pac. 269 (1910) ; a refusal to
allow a sixth amendment was held not an abuse of discretion, Consolidated Con-
cessions Co. v. McConnel, 40 Cal. App. 443, 180 Pac. 842 (1919); a fourth
amendment properly refused because "there should be a reasonable limitation
on the number of amendments allowed to any particular pleading." Sheldon v.
Board of Education of City of Lawrence, 134 Kan. 135, 4 P.(2d) 430 (1931).
While the trial court should be liberal in allowing amendments where the
defect in the complaint is one of form only, the plaintiff's leave to amend is
always of grace and not of right after a demurrer has been sustained. Billesbach
v. Larkey, 181 Cal. 649, 120 Pac. 31 (1911) ; Hamilton Trust Co. v. Shevlin, 141
N.Y.S. 232, 156 App. Div. 307 (1913); judgment affirmed, 215 N.Y. 735, 109
N.E. 1077 (1915).
It has been held error not to allow a third amendment to a complaint after
demurrer was sustained because it must first be clear that the complaint could
not be amended to obviate the objections. Hacner v. Ellis, 40 Cal. App. 57, 180
Pac. 30 (1919). Where the third amended complaint was plaintiff's first attempt
to set up a cause of action against the particular defendants exclusively, it must
first be clear on the record that it is legally impossible to amend before leave
to amend can be denied. Black v. Browne, 103 P.(2d) 1012 (Cal. App. 1940).
In a case where two federal courts had held contradictorily as to the validity
of a certain judgment, and that fact was at issue in the pending action, it was
held that while two special demurrers to plaintiff's declaration for matters of
form had been sustained, the court would permit a plaintiff to amend upon
proper terms "not only once, but twice or thrice more" where to deny that
opportunity would cut off part of plaintiff's remedy by exercise of the discre-
tion from which there is no appeal and where the case is important and diffi-
cult. Wilbur v. Abbot, 6 Fed. 817 (C.C.D. N.H. 1880).
Most statutes which grant this discretionary power to the trial court apply to
pleadings generally and not to the complaint alone. A Missouri statute, however,
specifies that the court shall allow a complaint to be amended no more than
three times. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 948. This limitation has been held to be
mandatory, leaving no discretion in the trial coure. Beardslee v. Morgner, 73 Mo.
22 (1880). In Wisconsin the code provides that pleadings shall be liberally con-
strued. Wis. STAT. (1941) § 263.27. By judicial interpretation it appears that
the same rules affecting amendments apply to answers as well as complaints,
for the court has said that "the statute providing that in construing a pleading
to determine its effect the allegations shall be liberally construed, every rea-
sonable intendment and presumption is to be made in favor of the pleader,
and if essential facts can be discovered, as alleged in the pleading, to exist
either by express statement or reasonable inference, it must be held good, though
its allegations be in form uncertain, defective, and incomplete." An order deny-
ing leave to amend an answer was in that case reversed. Palmersheim v. Hertel,
179 W. 291, 19i N.W. 567 (1923).
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